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Costly bank bailouts, such as those during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, are 
commonly attributed to policy “capture” by financial and corporate interests (Johnson and 
Kwak, 2010). These perceptions have been associated with rising political contestation, 
polarization and instability in mature democracies, with disruptive consequences for long-
established foreign and domestic policy norms (Tooze, 2018). We argue that crisis policy 
responses and their political aftermaths have become increasingly consequential, but should 
be understood in a panoramic context that takes account of a new form of mass politics 
associated with increasingly financialized middle class wealth. It reveals that the interaction 
between democratic politics and financialized wealth has destabilized both increasingly 
integrated financial systems and the socio-political underpinnings of neoliberal policy norms 
at the domestic and global levels.  
Our argument builds on and integrates different literatures: on financialization, which 
has devoted limited attention to post-crisis politics (Finlayson, 2009; Langley, 2009; van der 
Zwan, 2014; Watson, 2007); on comparative and international political economy research 
showing how rising household wealth and wealth inequality generate new political cleavages 
and shape actor behaviour (Ansell, 2014; Curtis et al., 2014; Pagliari et al., 2018; Schwartz 
and Seabrooke, 2009); on comparative post-crisis electoral politics (Ansell, 2017a; Bartels 
and Bermeo, 2014); and on the roles of evolutionary change and long cycles in the global 
political economy (Blyth and Matthijs, 2017; Fioretos, 2017). 
Specifically, we show how the financialization of mass household wealth has 
complicated and sharply raised the bar for government performance during major banking 
crises, with destabilizing political consequences. In democracies, many voters have become 
far more attentive to potential and actual wealth losses, and the perceived fairness of their 
distribution. Contrary to neoliberal policy norms and narratives of personal responsibility 
offered by politicians promoting financialization, most voters now expect governments to 
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protect their wealth during crises. Modern governments often accordingly intervene 
extensively to prevent catastrophic wealth destruction, offering bailouts that go far beyond 
the “Bagehot rule” of lending to normally solvent banks in return for good collateral 
(Bagehot, 1962; Rosas, 2006). Yet even modest wealth losses and perceived inequities of 
treatment can still be fatal for political incumbents and have powerful consequences for 
domestic and international politics. 
Elsewhere, using a large cross-national dataset extending from the early nineteenth to 
the early twenty first centuries, we show that rising household wealth in democracies is 
strongly associated with more extensive bailouts and rising political instability (Chwieroth 
and Walter 2019). It is also essential to investigate causal mechanisms in particular contexts 
(Lieberman, 2005; Munck and Snyder, 2007). “Nested analysis” can provide one means of 
doing this, but it is methodologically challenging (Rohlfing, 2008). We therefore provide 
additional justifications for our case selection. 
We compare long run developments in two major democracies – Britain and the 
United States – that are theoretically “typical” and “crucial” cases. Over the past two 
centuries, both exhibit large variation in our independent variables, democratization and the 
financialization of wealth and are at their leading edge (Lieberman 2005: 442-444). Until 
recently, they have also been prominently associated with global economic policy leadership 
and neoliberal policy norms. Within- and comparative case analysis allows us to gain deeper 
insight into the causal mechanisms shaping the policy and political outcomes of interest, 
enabling an assessment of our argument alongside alternative theories, for which both 
countries are often seen as crucial cases. We explore how the interaction between long run 
processes of democratization and the (more recent) financialization of mass wealth have 
reshaped policy interventions and the political aftermaths of systemic banking crises. We 
distinguish between an earlier era of “elite wealth dominance” and a more recent era of 
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“financialized mass wealth,” corresponding to the “old” and “new” politics of banking crises. 
The high concentration of wealth among elites in pre-1914 Britain and America was 
associated both with limited crisis interventions and surprisingly tranquil political aftermaths. 
By contrast, the 2007-9 crises in both countries epitomise the policy and political dilemmas 
facing elected governments in a new era of mass financialized wealth. We also briefly discuss 
how the iconic US case in the Great Depression indicates the transitional nature of this era.  
1 Theory and method  
We claim that evolutionary processes of democratization and the financialization of 
mass wealth have interacted to transform policy interventions and the political aftermaths of 
major banking crises in ways that have received insufficient attention (Bartels, 2014; Crespo-
Tenorio et al., 2014). In modern crises, since no longer only the wealth of a narrow group of 
elites is at risk, governments face much greater pressure to protect wealth from a wider 
political coalition comprising the middle class and wealthy elites. Yet these processes also 
render such interventions fraught with political risk. 
We follow others in defining the middle class as “those [households] ‘comfortably’ 
clear of being at-risk-of-poverty” but lacking sufficient wealth not to need to work (Atkinson 
and Brandolini, 2013: 79). We first briefly review evidence that middle class wealth grew to 
become substantial and financialized.  
Real per adult wealth has grown exponentially since the 1950s (Figure 1). Despite 
recent increases in wealth inequality in some countries (notably the United States), this trend 
applies generally to middle class households, with substantial variation within this category 
(Kuhn et al., 2018; Wolff, 2017a, 2017b; World Wealth & Income Database, 2017). 
Furthermore, middle class wealth has become increasingly financialized, meaning that its 
value reflects “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
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financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 
2005b: 3). Housing equity now dominates middle class wealth portfolios, whereas a century 
ago only a minority of households were owner-occupiers (Domanski et al., 2016: 62; United 
Nations Human Settlements Program, 2006). This was facilitated by a boom in post-war 
mortgage lending, linking housing equity values to the availability and cost of credit (Jordà et 
al., 2016). Pension assets, now the second largest component of middle class wealth 
portfolios, have shown a similar post-war trajectory and become increasingly financialized 
due to pension privatization and a shift towards defined contribution (DC) schemes (Brooks, 
2005). 
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Figure 1: Real net personal wealth per adult, selected countries 1850-2015, constant 2016 US 
dollars and PPP exchange rates 
 
 
Source: (World Wealth & Income Database, 2017). 
 
These core characteristics of mass wealth – its increased size, changing composition 
and rising exposure to financial markets – mean that many in the middle class have become 
more anxious about potential losses (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2017: 10–14; Watson, 2007). This has generated the emergence of “great expectations” 
among this crucial group of voters regarding government responsibility for wealth protection 
when it is threatened by financial instability (Chwieroth and Walter 2019). Democratization 
and suffrage expansions over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have increased this 
group’s ability to place electoral pressure on governments to meet these expectations.  
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Mass financialized wealth is historically recent. To illustrate in the British case, in the 
early nineteenth century, most wealth was property and business capital held by wealthy 
elites – a sizeable middle “wealth” class did not exist (Lindert, 1986; Offer, 1991; Piketty and 
Zucman, 2015). In 1873, less than a sixth of all households owned their own home; only 23 
percent did in 1918 (Lindert, 1986: 1142). Middle class home ownership grew rapidly after 
1945, peaking at 69 percent in 2001; the rapid expansion of mortgage lending made this 
possible (Jordà et al., 2016; Office for National Statistics, 2013). By 2008, about 55 percent 
of domestic wealth consisted of housing assets (Piketty and Zucman, 2015, fig. 15.1). 
Similarly, before 1945, household pensions comprised less than 0.03 percent of all financial 
assets, but they grew to roughly eight percent by 1966 and about 40 percent since 1987, with 
a strong trend towards market-exposed DC schemes from the 1980s (Office for National 
Statistics, 2014; Roe, 1971). The proportion of households with direct ownership of shares 
also grew from less than nine percent in 1983 to 22 percent in 1998 (Guiso et al., 2003), with 
such exposure increasing from the middle quintiles of the distribution. These characteristics 
distinguish the middle class from the very wealthy, for whom financial portfolio assets now 
dominate, housing and pension assets are relatively unimportant, and leverage far lower. 
These trends are largely replicated in the United States and other advanced democracies 
(Hoffman et al., 2009: 79–82; Wolff, 2017a, 2017b).  
Why should governments that respond to financial instability with policy 
interventions now be more likely to suffer politically? Fundamentally, this is because great 
expectations set a new, higher bar for government performance during crises that most 
incumbents find difficult to meet. First, voters with an enhanced stake in financial stability 
will likely interpret the onset of banking crises as an “incompetency signal.” Second, even 
well-managed crises are typically associated with large income and wealth losses (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009). Most voters hold government responsible because a personal 
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responsibility narrative is unattractive given growing dependence on “asset-based welfare” 
(Fligstein and Goldstein, 2015; Langley, 2009; Pagliari et al., 2018). People are also loss-
averse and less likely to attribute losses to personal choices than gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1984). Third, modern voters’ great expectations are often unrealistic, inconsistent 
and riddled with conflict. They want governments to protect their wealth but bridle at the 
large costs and inequity of bailing out institutions and bankers perceived as privileged and 
irresponsible. That is, many expect “ideal” interventions governments cannot achieve, which 
decisively and equitably alleviate financial distress for “ordinary” people at least cost to 
taxpayers (Financial Services Authority (UK), 2012; van der Cruijsen et al., 2013). Notably, 
governments cannot easily avoid supporting the large financial institutions at the centre of 
modern financial networks (Haldane and May, 2011). Institutional constraints mean that 
governments also respond slowly rather than decisively in crises (MacIntyre, 2003; Oatley, 
2004), exacerbating market contagion and wealth losses and raising bailout costs. All this 
allows media critics and political rivals to portray crisis interventions as excessively costly, 
delayed, misjudged, inadequate and unfair.  
Our argument departs from the “clarity of responsibility” hypothesis that voters will 
be more forgiving if low political and institutional unity makes it difficult to assign 
responsibility to individual policymakers (Powell and Whitten, 1993). Systemic banking 
crises differ from standard recessions in their comparative rarity and by exposing ordinary 
households to sudden, large wealth losses, placing a premium on a government’s ability to 
act quickly and efficiently. Most voters cannot judge whether delays or policy failures are the 
result of institutional constraints, deliberate choice, or incompetence. Banking crises can also 
generate policy gridlock by exacerbating creditor-debtor conflict, raising economic inequality 
and ideological polarization, and favouring selective interventions that appear to benefit 
special interests (Funke et al., 2016; McCarty et al., 2015; Mian et al., 2014). For these 
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reasons, voters will tend to judge government performance in the context of intra-crisis 
policy constraints negatively. Modern governments therefore face acute challenges in crises: 
they know that the political costs of not intervening are almost certainly greater than 
intervening, but the electoral rewards from intervention are tenuous.  
Our theory produces two main empirical expectations. First, democratization and the 
financialization of mass wealth should together have led to more extensive bailouts during 
systemic crises. Second, the propensity of modern voters to punish incumbent governments 
after crises should also have increased, especially when policy responses are perceived as 
delayed and unfairly redistributive.  
To investigate them, we undertake within- and across-case comparative analysis of 
the aftermaths of major banking crises in two important countries, Britain and the United 
States, before 1914 and over 2007-10, focusing on the large over-time variation in democracy 
and the financialization of wealth. We select these cases for two further reasons: both 
countries have become “exemplar financialized economies” (French et al., 2011: 805) and 
thus “crucial cases” for assessing its consequences (Gerring and Cojocaru, 2015); and both 
are crucial cases for alternative theories. 
One such theory is that non-democratic regimes are more likely than democracies to 
undertake bailouts during banking crises due to entrenched elite rent-seeking (Rosas, 2009). 
Thus, democratization should promote less extensive bailouts, though partisan politics may 
produce different responses (Garrett 1998). Others argue that the rise of neoliberalism since 
the 1970s has made governments less willing to intervene (Blyth, 2002), or that globalization 
has had a constraining effect (Andrews, 1994). Globalization is also said to make it less likely 
that voters will assign blame to incumbents (Hellwig and Samuels, 2007). For these theories, 
Britain and the United States are plausible crucial cases for claims concerning neoliberalism 
and globalization and differed in their partisan orientation over 2007-8.  
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Another school makes the opposite claim that bailouts should increase as financial 
actors “capture” policymaking, either via their extensive resources (Hacker and Pierson, 
2010; Johnson and Kwak, 2010) or the structural power deriving from their centrality to 
mature economies (Bell and Hindmoor, 2015; Culpepper and Reinke, 2014). These authors 
see recent experience in Britain and the United States as paradigmatic but identify different 
mechanisms to ours. 
To date, these competing claims have been assessed using historically narrow and 
recent time-windows. We extend the time horizon over nearly two centuries to examine the 
long UK and US experience with banking crises to better assess our theory against these 
alternatives. Our analysis here and elsewhere takes account of varying crisis frequency and 
severity, as well as financial openness (see online appendix and Chwieroth and Walter, 
2019).   
2 Pre-1914 crises  
We first consider the political consequences of the financial crisis in England in 1825-
6, the deepest before 2007-9 (Turner, 2014: 57–61). Even in 1825, policymakers possessed 
sufficient knowledge and policy tools to implement lender of last resort (LOLR) policies and 
bailouts. Both sets of policies had been pursued in earlier crises, including in 1793 (Bagehot, 
1962, chap. 7; Grossman, 2010: 99–101; Turner, 2014: 140–147). With its highly distressed 
financial sector and very limited democracy, we might expect elite rent-seeking to have 
induced a bailout in 1825, but we show this was not the case. Nor, despite the severe 
economic downturn and wealth destruction that followed, did the government’s policy stance 
play much role in contested 1826 elections. 
We then discuss the deep crisis of 1907 in the United States (Figure 2), where the 
majority of adult males were enfranchised – in sharp contrast to 1820s Britain. The United 
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States then lacked a central bank, focusing political pressure for crisis intervention on the 
Treasury. Yet the government chose to rely heavily on private sector actions that were 
insufficient to prevent an exceptionally deep downturn, again with few electoral 
consequences.  
 
Figure 2: Real GDP growth before and after five systemic banking crises in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, with next election years 
 
 
 
Source: (Johnson and Williamson, 2017; Thomas and Dimsdale, 2017). t = the first year of 
each crisis (Reinhart, 2010). Vertical lines indicate the next election year. For the UK, GDP 
growth estimates are for geographically consistent post-1922 political boundaries. 
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2.1 The 1825-6 English crisis 
A panic developed after the bursting of a speculative bubble in early 1825 that first 
affected English country banks but by December had spread to London (Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011: 88; Thomas, 1934: 61–64; Turner, 2014: 67). Nearly 10 percent (73 of 770) of 
country banks failed during this crisis and informed contemporaries believed the country 
came close to complete financial collapse (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011: 111; Thomas, 
1934: 55–56). After a hesitant and much-criticized initial response, the Bank of England 
provided liquidity assistance to banks on commercial terms that stemmed the financial crisis 
in late December. A deep recession and a “massive” wave of bankruptcies followed in early 
1826 (Gayer et al., 1975: 205). 
The main constituency favouring extensive intervention was the financial and 
merchant community in London and in the country. They did not lack political connections. 
Four MPs’ banks failed in the crisis (Fisher, 2009: 270). The Bank and other bankers 
pressured the government to suspend gold convertibility, as it had done from 1797 to 1821 
(Thomas, 1934: 56). Parliamentary representatives associated with the merchant class called 
for the emergency issuance of Exchequer bills to distressed merchants in exchange for goods 
collateral.  
Lord Liverpool’s Tory government rejected these demands (Brock, 1967: 210). It is 
unlikely this was due to a lack of physical (note issuance) or fiscal capacity: the government 
ran large net and primary fiscal surpluses during the 1820s and the ratio of public debt to 
GDP was falling (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2017). However, Liverpool convened a meeting 
with the Bank’s governor and encouraged him to print money and lend extensively against 
sound collateral (Brock, 1967: 205). Although privately owned and constrained by its public 
responsibility to maintain sterling’s gold convertibility, the Bank’s governors agreed 
reluctantly, keenly aware that its performance would shape political decisions about its next 
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charter renewal in 1833 (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011: 217). It lent extensively to other 
firms by discounting bills and issuing new notes on collateral (Brock, 1967: 206).  
This LOLR lending was largely consistent with the market-conforming approach 
advocated by Thornton, including collateralized lending and screening of borrowers 
(Bagehot, 1962: 25). It was not an indiscriminate bailout: dozens of insolvent financial 
institutions were allowed to fail. The government did indicate a willingness to reimburse 
Bank losses on advances it made on the limited quantity of Exchequer Bills outstanding, but 
it refused direct government relief to distressed firms.  
Despite Tory concerns with maintaining social order (Gambles 1999), there is little 
indication that Liverpool’s government, approaching its seven-year maximum duration, was 
seriously destabilized by this stance or by the deep recession that followed. The main issue in 
the 1826 election was not the government’s crisis policy stance but Catholic emancipation. 
There was no substantial swing against the Tories and the government was comfortably 
returned (Fisher, 2009: 329–330).  
The available evidence suggests this was not due to a shortage of contested elections. 
Of 28 individual bank failures we have identified from one key historical source, 11 occurred 
in constituencies with elections in 1826 (Fisher, 2009; Orbell and Turton, 2001). In these 
constituencies, in almost all cases where sitting Tories ran, they enjoyed an increase in their 
vote share.1  
The limited electoral impact of the government’s policy stance was probably linked to 
the salience of the emancipation question, but also to the great importance of land holdings in 
the wealth of the narrow electorate. Between 1820 and the Reform Act of 1832, the electoral 
franchise was property-based and included about three percent of the population (House of 
                                                     
1
 Author analysis of election data in Fisher (2009).  
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Commons Library, United Kingdom, 2013: 3–4). The landed elite dominated both houses of 
parliament. Estimates suggest that land values and rental income were relatively stable 
following the crisis (Gayer et al., 1975: 929; Jaevicius et al., 2015: 18). Land-owning voters 
also likely minimized their vulnerability to country bank failures by maintaining their 
primary accounts with London bankers, including the Bank of England (Pressnell, 1956: 
246–247). In short, the evidence suggests that Liverpool’s government faced a low level of 
political risk in choosing limited intervention. The pro-bailout coalition lacked political 
influence because of the high concentration of wealth and substantial intra-elite opposition to 
bailouts. 
2.2 The 1907-8 U.S. crisis 
Compared with 1820s Britain, the United States by 1907 exhibited much higher levels 
of democracy, financial development, and a more substantial middle class (Piketty and 
Zucman, 2014). Following a build-up of speculative pressure and banking sector fragility, a 
failed scheme to corner the copper market unleashed a sudden panic in New York in mid-
October 1907 (Bruner and Carr, 2007: 7–55). Smaller banks connected with the copper 
speculation and the Knickerbocker Trust Company applied unsuccessfully for financial 
assistance to the New York Clearing House (NYCH), a private consortium dominated by the 
city’s major banks. Panic spread, with about 70 banks and trusts collapsing over the final 
months of 1907 and some states declaring bank holidays (Conant, 1915: 714–718; 
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011: 212; Moen and Tallman, 1992). Total commercial failures in 
1908 increased by nearly 40 percent over the average levels of 1905-7, especially in Middle, 
Southern and Western states (U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, 1910: 547–549). 
The economy shrank by nearly 11 percent in 1908 and the unemployment rate reached over 
16 percent (Douglas and Director, 1931: 28).  
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Total U.S. deposits fell by about six percent from September to December 1907 
(Jaremski and Rousseau, 2018). Depositor losses were concentrated in state banks rather than 
in better capitalized national banks (Gorton, 1988). Real stock prices fell about 40 percent 
from their peak in September 1906 in the lead up to the October 1907 crisis, but largely 
recovered by the November 1908 elections. Real average house prices were less resilient, 
falling about 15 percent from their 1907 peak to their 1910 trough (Shiller, n.d.). However, 
such losses only affected a minority of wealthier households.  
Following Knickerbocker’s collapse, the NYCH moved, under the leadership of John 
Pierpont Morgan, to stem the panic by lending to the Trust Company of America and brokers 
at the New York Stock Exchange (Bruner and Carr, 2007: 83–102). At Morgan’s request, the 
Treasury deposited more government cash in approved banks and widened the acceptable 
range of instruments national banks could use to back note issuance (Conant, 1915: 714; 
McCulley, 1992: 100–147; Taus, 1943: 123–125). However, by early November the Treasury 
was running out of cash and failed to do much more (Bruner and Carr, 2007: 22, 34, 86–87, 
136). The NYCH responded by issuing over $100 million of loan certificates and suspending 
cash payments (McCulley, 1992: 146–147). The panic eventually subsided in early 
November with the provision of further substantial private sector assistance to major New 
York trusts, the news that nearly $100 million in gold had arrived from Europe, and the 
announcement that US Steel would acquire the financially distressed Tennessee Coal and 
Iron (TCI) company (Bruner and Carr, 2007: 108, 124–139).  
The government saw limited demand from the great majority of voters for bailouts. 
Most US households then held little wealth and their exposure to financial markets was low 
by late twentieth century standards (Piketty and Zucman, 2015; Short, 2002). Reflecting this, 
there was no strong clamour from the opposition Democrats or their constituents for more 
extensive government intervention, with the exception of demands by poor farmers for 
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deposit insurance championed by William Jennings Bryan. While these interests would later 
under Woodrow Wilson shape the creation of the Federal Reserve and a new farm credit 
system, the government, along with financial interests, most major newspapers outside the 
West and orthodox economists, rejected this demand (McCulley, 1992: 155–158; Sanders, 
1999: 236-261).  
The powerful negative economic impact of the crisis would very likely have harmed 
the incumbent Republican Party in a more recent presidential contest. Yet its candidate, 
William Howard Taft, easily beat his Democratic opponent, Bryan, by 51.1 percent of the 
popular vote to 43 percent in the election of November 1908. The weak political impact of 
the banking crisis is also indicated by the fact that states with more bank failures were not 
significantly more likely to inflict greater punishment on the Republican presidential 
candidate in November 1908 (Figure 3) or on the party’s congressional candidates.2  
 
  
                                                     
2
 The results are unchanged when we consider national bank failures. The bivariate relationship for the 
congressional seat outcomes is insignificant including (.0047, p=.795) and excluding (-.005, p=.709) potential 
outliers. 
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Figure 3: Bank failures by U.S. state, 1907-8, and percent change in Republican presidential 
candidate vote share, 1904-8 
 
 
 
Source: (Comptroller of the Currency (U.S.), 1909; Moore, 1985). The bivariate relationship 
is insignificant including (-.072, p=.6364) and excluding (-.2450, p=.1132) potential outliers. 
 
Taken together, these results support our claim that the low level of mass wealth 
lowered the political risks of a non-interventionist policy stance. 
3 The 2007-9 crises in the United Kingdom and the United States 
Government interventions were far more extensive over 2007-9 in both countries. In 
addition to exceptionally large central bank liquidity provision, governments provided 
unprecedented public guarantees to previously uninsured financial system liabilities, 
purchased private institutions’ distressed assets, and injected capital into major financial 
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institutions (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). These outcomes are inconsistent with broad claims 
that greater democracy, globalization and neoliberal ideology are powerful constraints on 
government bailouts. We show that the financialization of mass wealth in both democracies 
provides a more compelling explanation of these policy responses and of the much greater 
electoral punishment that followed.  
3.1 British policy responses and the political aftermath 
One reason why the Labour government gained little political advantage from its 
crisis interventions was that the opposition Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties 
quickly supported public intervention and distanced themselves from the banks, focusing 
attention on internal conflict among “New” and “Old” Labour Party factions (Darling, 2011: 
54,68,174). They framed specific aspects of the package as overly costly, distributionally 
unfair but, crucially, as the economic costs of the crisis accumulated, also ineffective. These 
tactics demonstrate that all major parties were now responding to voters’ entrenched great 
expectations. As our theory predicts, the outbreak of the crisis from August 2007 sent voters 
a strong negative signal regarding Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s signature economic 
policy competence (BBC News, 2007; Croft, 2007). Public support for the Labour 
government collapsed after August 2007, falling from about 40 percent to about 25 percent 
by June 2008, by which time the Conservative opposition had a commanding lead. Brown 
and Chancellor Alastair Darling were keenly aware of these reputational consequences and 
their reluctance to discard the defining ideological attributes of “New Labour” led them to 
delay nationalizing Northern Rock for months until there was no alternative. Brown also 
sought to deflect responsibility by asserting that the crisis was “global” in nature, a tactic 
doomed by his earlier embrace of “light touch” financial regulation (Coates, 2009: 424–425; 
Foley, 2009).  
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Also consistent with our argument, voters responded more positively when the 
government acted with greater speed and purpose during the peak of the crisis in late 2008 
(Quaglia, 2009). Support for the government recovered somewhat in the second half of 2008, 
including during the peak of the crisis in September-October 2008 and the large interventions 
that followed this. However, the aggregate size of the banking sector support package 
continued to escalate in the following months, reaching a spectacular 80 percent of GDP by 
2009 (International Monetary Fund, 2010: 17). This deepened the public perception that 
bankers were being rescued while large costs would be borne by taxpayers and public sector 
beneficiaries – despite government denials. This growing perception of distributional inequity 
and the onset of income and wealth destruction fatally eroded voter support for Labour from 
early 2009.3 
For many voters outside London, this was made worse by the fact that the perceived 
recipients of this largesse were located there, notably highly paid City financiers and the 
highly distrusted banks (British Social Attitudes, n.d.). Pre-crisis gains in housing wealth 
were also disproportionately concentrated in London and surrounding counties, and sustained 
thereafter (Haldane, 2016: 19). The government’s counterfactual argument that everyone 
would have been far worse off had it not intervened thus gained little political traction 
(Financial Times, 2009; Haldane, 2018: 4–5). As the economy deteriorated over 2009, public 
support for the financial sector interventions fell substantially. The middle class was hit 
hardest: excepting the bottom two quartiles, most households saw their real incomes and 
wealth fall or stagnate in the period before the 2010 election (Office for National Statistics, 
2017). This was particularly true for younger households, who were more leveraged and 
more likely to hold DC pensions, and for households outside London and the Southeast living 
                                                     
3
 For additional detail on the evolution of British public opinion see the online appendix. 
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in regions suffering from long term decline (Corlett and Judge, 2017: 30; Rodríguez-Pose, 
2018). Average house prices fell by about 15 percent in real terms from 2008 to 2010 (Knoll 
et al., 2017: 344), yet continued to rise in wealthier parts of London and the Southeast, 
exacerbating perceptions of unfairness. Average real per capita wealth fell by nine percent 
from 2007 to 2009 while the wealth share of the top one percent of households increased; 
many voters also perceived inequality as rising (Atkinson et al., 2017; PewResearchCenter, 
2013: 21–22). The government’s political room for fiscal redistribution was constrained by 
ideology and its electoral strategy, which had depended on gaining the support of relatively 
prosperous centrist voters (Hopkin and Viarengo, 2012: 119). Rising public resentment about 
the distributional effects of the interventions limited the credit the government could claim 
from “saving the economy” (Woll, 2014: 106).  
Labour was decisively defeated in the May election, gaining 29 percent of the vote 
compared to 36 percent for the Conservatives and 23 percent for the Liberal Democrats. The 
swing against the government was -6.2 percent compared to 2005. This was the second worst 
electoral result for the Labour Party since the war, only marginally better than the disastrous 
1983 election.  
To our knowledge, there are no opinion surveys that directly relate voter attitudes to 
government policy responses over 2007-9 with household wealth and leverage attributes. 
Surveys by the financial regulator since 2003 do consistently show that only about 30% of 
respondents hold the view that, in principle, the authorities will allow any financial firm to 
fail (Financial Services Authority (UK), 2012: 34). The remainder believe that either some or 
all will be bailed out (41% over the pre-crisis period 2003-7), or don’t know (26% on average 
over the same period) (Financial Services Authority (UK), 2009: 26). While these results are 
not differentiated by respondent wealth attributes, there are strong indications that Labour’s 
electoral losses were related to such attributes. In May 2010, the government experienced 
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disproportionately large losses in constituencies in which house prices had fallen most – that 
is, precisely where the middle class was most exposed to wealth losses (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: House price index percentage change (June 2007 to May 2010) and Labour Party 
vote percentage change (2010 vs. 2005), all parliamentary constituencies. 
 
Source: Pippa Norris shared datasets, https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm; 
UK House Price Index, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/about-the-uk-house-
price-index.  The bivariate relationship is significant including (.235 p<.001) and excluding 
(.237 p<.001) potential outliers. 
 
In combination with the other evidence we have discussed, it is reasonable to infer 
that a large segment of voters supported interventions in principle, but reacted negatively to 
policies they perceived as unfairly costly for themselves and disproportionately beneficial to 
the City and the wealthy generally. This outcome was striking for a government that strongly 
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believed it had responded effectively to voter expectations about wealth and income 
protection by preventing a complete financial collapse.  
3.2 US policy responses and the political aftermath 
The US case over 2007-9 exhibits even more strongly the rising political pressure on 
governments to intervene during recent banking crises and the perils of doing so. The pro-
market Bush administration and the Federal Reserve were, like their British counterparts, 
opposed on ideological grounds to bailouts. Yet they moved fitfully but inexorably towards 
extensive interventions: the comparatively high level of institutional vetoes and political 
polarization produced extended legislative delays and outright failures in crucial areas. The 
most spectacular example was Congress’s initial rejection of the Bush administration’s 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in September 2008. Yet for more than a year before 
this, the administration struggled to gain support in Congress for its proposals to tackle the 
deepening crisis.  
The policy delays were exemplified by the indecision regarding the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Both the Fed and the government knew as early as March 
2007 that taxpayer money would be required to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which 
then held or guaranteed about $5.2 trillion of home mortgage debt and which were caught in 
the vortex of a collapsing securitized debt market (Bernanke, 2015, chap. 11; Frame et al., 
2015; Wessel, 2009, chap. 10). But many in Congress feared a voter backlash from a bailout. 
Political consensus on action was unachievable before the GSEs faced collapse more than a 
year later, when Congress passed legislation on 30 July 2008 enabling public 
“conservatorship” and costly recapitalizations (Paulson, 2010: 139, 143).  
Government indecision shifted the policy burden to the Fed, which had provided 
generalized liquidity support consistent with the Bagehot rule. From December 2007, the Fed 
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began to depart substantially from this rule in offering a series of new liquidity facilities on 
increasingly generous terms; these grew dramatically after September 2008 (Bernanke, 2015: 
410; Mishkin and White, 2016). By late October 2008, the Fed had also provided $117 
billion in direct support to Bear Stearns and AIG, testing the political limits of its authority 
and reinforcing the public perception that the authorities were bailing out Wall Street 
(Jacobe, 2008). For this reason, Barack Obama and John McCain, the Democratic and 
Republican candidates in the looming presidential elections, both felt compelled to oppose 
the GSE bailouts. There was no political appetite to repeat the favour for Lehman Brothers 
when it faced collapse in September (Paulson, 2010: 183). When its bankruptcy prompted a 
seizure of the interbank market, the Fed provided an $85 billion direct loan to AIG in return 
for 79.9 percent of its stock, widely interpreted as providing a back-door bailout of major 
banks, including many foreign ones (CBS News, 2009; Pirrong, 2009). While a majority of 
voters in the pre-TARP period supported a Wall Street rescue, many worried that most costs 
would fall on taxpayers (Goldman, 2008; PewResearchCenter, 2008; Smith, 2014: 105).  
When Treasury unveiled its sketchy TARP proposal to purchase illiquid assets from 
major banks it met bipartisan hostility in Congress. In an effort to build political support for 
the plan President Bush addressed voters, saying that while he understood why ordinary 
Americans disliked a bailout, “not passing a bill now would cost these Americans much more 
later” (New York Times, 2008). This plea was ineffective. Although retiring members of 
Congress were more supportive, others believed the weight of opinion in their constituencies 
opposed a bailout (McCarty et al., 2013: 214–223; Paulson, 2010: 286).  
As in the British case, voter attitudes were complex and conflicted. The negative 
market reaction to Congress’s rejection of TARP on 29 September threatened further wealth 
losses. A day after the vote, a Gallup/USA Today poll found 77 percent now supported 
government intervention via the same bill or a new plan (Gallup, 2008). Members of 
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Congress reported calls from constituents concerned about their life savings (Geithner, 2015: 
221; McCarty et al., 2013: 234–237; Morales, 2008).  An Ipsos/McClatchy poll over October 
2-6 found a clear majority of respondents supported a government “rescue” but not a 
“bailout” of financial markets, suggesting most voters favoured an intervention that did not 
let banks off the hook (Bowman and Rugg, 2010: 10). After Senate amendments including 
business tax breaks and an increase in deposit insurance to $250,000 per account, Congress 
passed a revised bill on October 3. Yet 46 percent of Republicans voted against it. The Bush 
administration used the funds to buy preferred non-voting stock in banks, to inject a further 
$40 billion into AIG (later increased to $70 billion), to provide liability guarantees for 
Citigroup and Bank of America and assistance to the ailing automobile sector.  
The passage of TARP (just) allowed the incumbent Republicans to avoid what the 
administration and senior leadership of both parties agreed would have been a policy 
catastrophe, but it underlined the knife-edge politics of modern bailouts. The administration 
and the Fed wanted to prevent a second Great Depression, but their political dilemma – 
shared by Britain’s Labour government – was that financialization meant this could not be 
done without a wholesale rescue of major financial firms, which voters clearly disliked 
(Bernanke, 2015: 145, 416; Bush, 2011: 458; Geithner, 2015: 248; Paulson, 2010). After the 
November 2008 elections, more Congressional Republicans distanced themselves from such 
interventions.  
Housing market politics was also fraught. As in Britain, middle class American 
households have become increasingly leveraged since the early twentieth century, especially 
since the 1980s. References to the “sub-prime crisis” of 2007 notwithstanding, many middle 
income prime borrowers used mortgage debt to invest aggressively in property and these 
borrowers’ share of total defaults increased sharply over 2006-9 (Albanesi et al., 2017; 
Adelino et al., 2017). By the 2000s, housing equity constituted the largest component of the 
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middle class’s net wealth, with pension assets second in importance (Kuhn et al., 2018; 
Wolff, 2017a: 568).  
The housing market downturn was thus a crucial driver of middle class wealth losses 
after 2006. These losses were more evident to most voters by the November 2008 election 
than employment losses. Unemployment was then 6.8 percent – not yet unusually high for a 
recession and lower than in the 1908 election. Yet in a Pew survey in early 2009, 36 percent 
of respondents aged 30-49 believed their investment losses exceeded 20 percent; the figure 
for those aged 50-64 was 43 percent. Three-quarters of the latter group reported that the crisis 
had made it difficult for them to afford retirement (Morin and Taylor, 2009). Over 2007-
2010, Fed household survey estimates show that median real household wealth fell 
precipitously by 44 percent to its lowest level since 1969, “[wiping] out 40 years of wealth 
gains” (Wolff, 2017b: 36). As middle class households had invested most during the housing 
boom, they suffered more in the bust. The average home ownership rate for the middle three 
wealth quintiles fell sharply from 78.2 to 67 percent, more than for other quintiles (Bricker et 
al., 2017: 1–2; Wolff, 2017b: 51).  
The stock market collapse, given the rising dependence of middle-class Americans on 
DC retirement plans, compounded housing losses. Stock losses were even sharper than house 
price losses before the November 2008 election. The S&P Composite stock index had fallen 
42.6 percent from its pre-crisis peak to November 2008, compared to a 15.5 percent fall for 
national house prices (Shiller, n.d.).  
There is considerable evidence that wealth losses, concentrated among middle class 
households, significantly shaped voting behaviour. Antoniades and Calomiris show that the 
sharp contraction of mortgage credit was more important than rising unemployment in 
reducing voter support for incumbent Republicans before the election (Antoniades and 
Calomiris, 2018). Other studies and polls indicate that household exposure to stock market 
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risk increased support for TARP and for Obama in the 2008 election among middle class and 
wealthier households (Hill et al., 2010; Meckler, 2008; Pagliari et al., 2018). Our own 
analysis also shows that at the county level, Republican losses in the November presidential 
election were significantly associated with house price losses (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: House price index percentage change (2007-8), and Republican Party presidential 
vote percentage change (2004-8), all US counties. 
 
Source: (Bogin et al., 2016; MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2018). The bivariate 
relationship is significant including (.1643 p<.001) and excluding (.1646 p<.001) potential 
outliers. 
These losses were at odds with voters’ great expectations and compounded their 
perceptions of the unfairness of the interventions. Polls immediately after TARP’s passage 
indicated that most respondents believed Wall Street and elites would benefit most (Bowman 
and Rugg, 2010: 15–16). These perceptions were reinforced over time and layered onto long-
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running concerns among a majority of Americans of rising distributional unfairness, 
perceptions that aligned with rising measured wealth inequality (Bricker et al., 2017: 1–2; 
Wolff, 2017b: 10–12). BBC World Service polls found that a majority of American 
respondents agreed that “economic benefits and burdens have been unfairly shared in recent 
years” (52% in 2008, 54% in 2009, and 65% in 2012) (BBC World Service, 2012). Similarly, 
a 2013 Pew survey found 47%  of respondents agreeing that “inequality is a very big 
problem,” 66% agreeing that “the gap between rich and poor has increased” and 61% 
agreeing that “the system favours the wealthy” (PewResearchCenter, 2013: 21–22).     
It was not difficult for the media and Democratic opponents to frame the Bush 
administration’s interventions as ineffective and unfair (BBC Press Office, 2010; McCarty et 
al., 2013: 234–236). In the final month of the election campaign, Obama opened up a 
substantial lead over McCain, who had led briefly in most polls in early September but then 
lost ground as he failed to distance himself from the administration’s policies (Jacobson, 
2010: 216; RealClear Politics, 2008; Saad et al., 2008). Obama’s election victory margin of 
7.2 percent was substantial though not a landslide, perhaps because the government’s policy 
interventions had prevented another Great Depression (Bartels, 2013: 53). The new 
administration would also suffer from the sustained economic trauma wrought by the crisis 
and its own policy interventions, contributing to large Democrat losses in the 2010 mid-term 
elections (Chwieroth and Walter 2019).  
4 The interwar period as a transitional era 
If our argument is correct, we would expect the combination of a post-1918 expansion 
of democracy and rising but still limited mass financialized wealth to have produced partial 
signs of this effect in the interwar period. We briefly illustrate the important US interwar 
case, which is consistent with this expectation. 
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Although the level of financialization achieved in the United States by the late 1920s 
was substantially lower than that reached in recent decades, it was high by contemporary 
standards. A boom in mortgage financing in the 1920s and relatively high rates of owner-
occupation (nearly half of all households) compared to Europe created a substantial 
constituency for protecting housing wealth among distressed urban homeowners and farmers, 
the construction industry and employees, banks, buildings and loan associations, mutual 
savings banks and insurance companies (Olson, 1988: 94). By 1933, a quarter or more of 
homeowners were in default (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2011: 1). In July 1932, 
Congress passed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act to promote lending for house building and 
to reduce foreclosures, and the Emergency Relief and Construction Act to fund public works. 
Yet house prices continued to fall and bank failures accelerated in late 1932 before a final 
dramatic collapse in March 1933 (U.S. Federal Reserve, 1937: 909).  
Policymakers had failed to tackle the underlying banking sector problems (Meltzer, 
2010, chap. 5; Mishkin and White, 2016: 21). With the cooperation of Congressional 
Democrats, President Herbert Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC) with $500 million of public funds in January 1932 to provide collateralized loans to 
local and state governments, banks and businesses. But a conservative lending policy limited 
its impact (Olson, 1988: 19–21). Meanwhile, Federal Reserve banks had pursued 
“liquidationist” policies in some regions and LOLR policies in others (Jalil, 2014; Richardson 
and Troost, 2009). The Fed’s belief that enough had been done by early 1930 held despite 
accelerating bank failures, a position supported by the Hoover administration. Although the 
first Glass-Steagall act of February 1932 extended the Fed’s ability to discount, its purchase 
program swung back towards caution by mid-year and worsened the crisis (Meltzer, 2010: 
347, fn.83).  
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The new President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, shifted towards a bailout strategy. He 
immediately declared a national bank holiday and an accompanying emergency plan to 
protect depositors, reopen sound banks and reorganize others, and empower the Fed to lend 
more decisively (Burns, 1974: 46–47). The Emergency Banking Act (EBA) of March 9th 
1933 sanctioned the bank closures and gave the President powers to restructure and reopen 
closed banks. The RFC would take equity stakes in national and state banks (after 
government audits) to restore solvency and could provide collateralized loans to closed banks 
to unfreeze deposits (Olson, 1988: 64–65, 81). Recapitalizations enabled the gradual 
reopening of banks deemed solvent by the Treasury; insolvent banks were to be wound up. In 
a less financialized economy than today this was easier to achieve. The RFC often limited 
bank executives’ salaries, helping to deflect criticism that it was enriching the wealthy 
(Olson, 1988: 126). The EBA also allowed the Fed to make advances in “exceptional and 
exigent circumstances” to member banks on any acceptable assets – a provision made 
permanent in the 1935 Banking Act.  
The Roosevelt administration also moved quickly to support the wealth of ordinary 
households in a way that was absent in 1907-8. It adopted a de facto deposit insurance system 
by committing the Fed to lend money to Treasury-vetted banks, and it ultimately accepted a 
Congressional proposal for a formal deposit insurance regime managed by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation targeted at small savers (Silber, 2009: 20). It undertook new 
initiatives to promote home ownership and associated building via intervention in the 
distressed mortgage market (Fishback, 2017). The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) 
was established as a government-sponsored corporation in June 1933 with RFC capital to 
borrow so as to refinance mortgages in default to prevent foreclosure and to buy bad loans 
from banks (Wheelock, 2008). The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was also 
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established in 1934 as a government agency to, among other things, insure and thereby 
subsidize mortgage lending.  
Roosevelt won by a landslide in the November 1932 election with 57.4 percent of the 
popular vote compared to Hoover’s 39.6 percent. We find, only after excluding a likely 
outlier and only in the presidential election, a weak negative relationship between state-level 
bank failures and the electoral swing against the incumbent Republican party in 1932 (Figure 
6).4 However, the incumbent Republicans suffered significantly greater losses in 1932 than 
they did in 1908 in states in which bank failures were higher than average.5 This suggests that 
the political costs of financial instability were increasing for incumbents, though not yet at 
the level of 2008-10. Democratic dominance throughout the 1930s suggests that although the 
administration’s efforts to protect ordinary householders’ wealth were modest compared to 
the interventions of 2007-9, they were more consistent with most voters’ expectations. 
Evidence from other interwar democracies paints a similar picture.6 
 
  
                                                     
4
 The bivariate relationship for House congressional seats is insignificant (-.0004, p=.424), with no outliers 
detected. 
5
 The difference in means for both seat losses (4.9 in 1932 versus 1.4 in 1908, t=2.30, p<.05) and seat share 
swing (-42.7 percent in 1932 versus -5.2 percent in 1908, t=2.76, p<.05) is significant.  
6
 See: Belgium and the Netherlands (Vanthemsche, 1991), Denmark (Hansen, 1994), Norway (Knutsen, 1994), 
and generally (James et al., 1991; Olsson, 1991). 
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Figure 6: Bank failures by U.S. state, 1929 - 32, and percent change in Republican 
presidential candidate vote share, 1928-32. 
 
Source: (Moore, 1985; U.S. Federal Reserve, 1937). The bivariate relationship is 
insignificant including potential outliers (-.1711, p=.245). Excluding potential outliers, it is 
significant at p<.10 (-.277, p=.059).  
 
5 Conclusion 
Our panoramic analysis reveals the political impact of the rise of mass middle class 
wealth over two centuries. Rising democratization cannot account for the evolving form of 
mass politics we observe, as the case of the 1908 U.S. election suggests.7 In addition, the 
policy and political aftermath of the interwar US crisis is consistent with the rising but still 
                                                     
7
 Many African Americans, representing about 10 percent of the total population, were still disenfranchised but 
held little wealth. Women were enfranchised in 1920 and could own property.  
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limited financialization of mass wealth at this time. It is the combination of financialized 
mass middle class wealth and electoral democracy that has transformed the aftermaths of 
systemic banking crises over the long run. 
Democratic political institutions contribute in another way in an era of great 
expectations. In both cases after 2007, especially in the United States, institutional constraints 
in the context of political polarization generated substantial delays in government policy 
responses. These further undermined public perceptions of policy competence and 
exacerbated wealth losses, with powerful political consequences that were largely absent in 
the pre-1914 crises. This suggests that institutional and political features that constrain the 
ability of governments to undertake the efficient, effective and fair crisis interventions now 
expected by many voters make them more rather than less inclined to punish incumbents. The 
emergence of “asset dominance” and rising financial instability may thereby invert the rule 
that voters are more forgiving in circumstances of lower institutional clarity. 
Might our findings be driven by evolving voter understandings of the appropriate role 
of the state in reducing risk to individuals? In the online appendix, using data from the World 
Values Survey (WVS) from 1981 to 2014, we show that public opinion over this period 
exhibits no discernable trend towards rising expectations of general government 
responsibilities. Our finding that voters increasingly expected extensive stabilizing financial 
interventions as private wealth accumulated over this period is thus probably specific to this 
policy domain.  
Indeed, Ansell (2014) shows that rising housing wealth in democratic countries is 
associated with less support for general redistribution and social insurance policies. The long 
run expansion of the welfare state in both countries seems not to have substantially reduced 
rising mass anxiety about the threat crises pose to household wealth. If welfare transfers 
dampen societal discontent following crises (Anderson and Hecht, 2014), then voter anxiety 
 32 
about banking crises should be strongest in countries with weaker welfare states. Yet such 
anxieties were as evident in Britain, with its larger welfare state, as in the United States. 
Further research could assess whether more extensive welfare states in parts of Western 
Europe and Scandinavia provide a stronger buffer, although financialization and private 
“asset-based welfare” is increasingly evident even there, and such safety nets protect 
employment income more than household assets (Aalbers, 2016; Belfrage and Kallifatides, 
2018). 
Our argument has further implications. First, scholars should attend to how long term 
developments can transform household interests and social expectations regarding 
government policy responsibilities. Prospects for government survival in an era of rising 
mass wealth and financialization have become more fraught, in part because voters can have 
unrealistic expectations of government performance. Such expectations have also increased 
the political leverage of pro-bailout elites during crises – a kind of “political structural 
power” that accrues less from globalization than from financialization. 
Second, although our findings are consistent with the claim that the rise of mass 
wealth can shift voters towards more conservative political views (Ansell, 2014), these 
effects may be dynamically unstable. Households may embrace the opportunities provided by 
financialization during asset booms, then demand government protection during busts. This 
likely exacerbates societal conflict and contributes to growing volatility in domestic and 
foreign policies. 
Finally, the political aftermaths of modern crises may have become increasingly 
prolonged. The rising mass stake in asset markets can generate extended political economy 
cycles that disadvantage successive governments, as the political reversal experienced by the 
Democrats after November 2008 attests. The effects of crises and associated interventions 
also exacerbate the divergence in house prices between thriving and declining regions, 
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reinforcing the perception of voters in the latter of being “left behind” and their willingness to 
reject neoliberal policy norms (Ansell, 2017b; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). The rise of mass 
wealth and financialization may thus have contributed to the widespread erosion of faith in 
democratic politics and in longstanding foreign policies (Foa and Mounk, 2017). 
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